Abstract-In this paper, we propose a revenue optimization framework integrating demand learning and dynamic pricing for firms in monopoly or oligopoly markets. We introduce a state-space model for this revenue management problem, which incorporates game-theoretic demand dynamics and nonparametric techniques for estimating the evolution of underlying state variables. Under this framework, stringent model assumptions are removed. We develop a new demand learning algorithm using Markov chain Monte Carlo methods to estimate model parameters, unobserved state variables, and functional coefficients in the nonparametric part. Based on these estimates, future price sensitivities can be predicted, and the optimal pricing policy for the next planning period is obtained. To test the performance of demand learning strategies, we solve a monopoly firm's revenue maximizing problem in simulation studies. We then extend this paradigm to dynamic competition, where the problem is formulated as a differential variational inequality. Numerical examples show that our demand learning algorithm is efficient and robust.
companies), the retail industry (department stores), and the ecommerce (see [4] ). This requires us to carefully exploit efficient mathematical models and computational techniques in light of recent developments in statistics, optimization, and game theory.
In the revenue management literature, many methods have been proposed to resolve the uncertainty of demands. They incorporated learning mechanisms either by experimentation or taking advantage of historical market data. Balvers and Cosimano [5] modeled demands as a linear function of prices with unknown slopes and intercepts, which motivated to learn by estimating parameters in the linear model. Mirman et al. [6] further examined the incentives of demand learning, and established two necessary conditions for a firm to learn uncertain demand curve from experiments. Later, Petruzzi and Dada [7] considered a demand model with both additive and multiplicative stochastic components, whose distributions are updated over time using Bayes' rule. Huang and Fang [8] incorporated a planned warranty term of products as a new factor in a demand function, and estimated uncertain parameters by market survey and analysis before utilizing a Bayesian decision model to determine the optimal warranty proportion in postsales service.
On the other hand, some researchers formulated demand dynamics from the perspective of customers' behavior. Gallego and van Ryzin [9] assumed that the number of customer arrivals has a Poisson distribution with exponentially distributed reservation prices in their mind. Under this assumption, optimal pricing strategy can be derived analytically. Aviv and Pazgal [10] and Araman and Caldentey [11] extended this idea to gamma distribution and two-point distribution, respectively. However, under this setting, beliefs about the distributions of several random variables have to be put a priori, and the impact of firms' historical prices was ignored.
Recent works on demand learning have begun to address the issue of competition. Bertsimas and Perakis [4] assumed that demand is a linear function of a firm's price and its competitors' prices, and estimated parameters using a least-squares method in cases of both monopoly and duopoly. Kwon et al. [12] considered dynamic games for demand learning, where the relationship between demand and price was characterized by evolutionary dynamics from the perspective of game theory. In their work, underlying price sensitivities were assumed to follow a random walk. Although this assumption guarantees a closed-form solution provided by the Kalman filter, it is too restrictive and the whole algorithm will break down if this assumption is violated. Moreover, in practice, the model fails to capture future price sensitivity based on its patterns from the past.
In this paper, we propose a general framework for demand learning based on state-space models. The state-space model has been a powerful tool in modeling and forecasting dynamic systems, which was introduced by Kalman [13] and Kalman and Bucy [14] . It consists of an observation equation, which characterizes the dynamics of observed inputs and outputs, and a state equation, which describes the evolution of underlying unobserved state variables of the system we are interested in. For a state-space model with the linear state dynamics, the Kalman filter yields good estimation and prediction. If the underlying state dynamics is not linear, the solution requires approximation or computation-intensive methods based on numerical integration. Pole and West [15] used Gaussian quadrature techniques in a Bayesian analysis of nonlinear dynamics models, and Carlin et al. [16] developed a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach for nonlinear and non-Gaussian state-space models.
When the price sensitivities in the demand function is considered as an unobservable state variable in a state-space model, the successes of demand learning and revenue maximization largely rely on estimating the pattern of the price sensitivities with high accuracy. The random walk assumption in [12] implies that the historical price sensitivities provide no information about its future changes, since it is assumed that the price sensitivity at time t equals the price sensitivity at time t-1 plus Gaussian noise. Although this assumption provides analytical tractability, it may not be realistic in practice. In this paper, we greatly generalize this assumption by not making any assumption about the parametric form of the unobserved price sensitivity dynamics (i.e., the structure of the state equation) but learning it from the historical market data. Our method could discover the underlying patterns of the price sensitivities from the available market data, and automatically formulate the state equation that best describes how price sensitivities evolve over time. To be more precise, we incorporate a nonparametric functional-coefficient autoregressive (FAR) model to describe the nonlinear time series of the price sensitivities. This nonparametric technique relaxes parametric constraints, such that prior knowledge on the state equation structure is not required. Therefore, in our general state-space model, the observed demands and prices are described by a parametric observation equation, and the underlying state dynamics is captured by the nonparametric FAR model in the state equation. We develop a Bayesian method using MCMC algorithms to estimate model parameters, latent state variables, and functional coefficients jointly. Then, we employ a simulated annealing algorithm for solving a single firm's pricing problem, and a fixed-point algorithm for a noncooperative competition problem.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe a revenue management model including demand dynamics, the evolution of underlying state variables, an optimal control formulation for a monopoly market, and a differential variational inequality (DVI) formulation for competition. In Section III, we explain the estimation and prediction procedures for the statespace model. Numerical examples and managerial implications for a monopoly and an oligopoly are presented in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes this paper.
II. REVENUE MANAGEMENT MODEL

A. Demand Dynamics
We assume that customers are sensitive to the change of price. If there are multiple firms, customers are always searching for services or products at the most competitive prices. These socalled bargain-hunting buyers have no brand preference, and are willing to sacrifice some convenience for the sake of a lower price.
Following the game-theoretic dynamics proposed by Fudenberg and Levine [17] , we assume that at time t, customers have a "reference price" in mind which reflects the market condition, and the demand at time t is a function of the difference between the current market price and the reference price. More precisely, the reference priceπ i is the weighted moving average price of past k time period of all firms:
where F is the set of firms, τ 
. By choosing k, the impact significance of historical prices on the current market is specified. Then, from the perspective of the evolutionary game theory, the demand D f i (t) for the service type i offered by a firm f ∈ F evolves as follows:
The exogenous quantity η f i could be interpreted as the price sensitivity of demand. It controls how quickly market demand reacts to price changes of service type i from the firm f. The firm estimates this unknown quantity by observing and analyzing the past market data.
This equation describes the relationship between observed demands and prices, and is usually called the observation equation in a state-space framework. Since the demand dynamics is a function of firms' pricing strategy and consumers' price sensitivity, once price sensitivities over time are predicted, demand dynamics over a time interval will be determined by prices for the same period. Therefore, the revenue maximization problem reduces to an optimization problem over a closed set of prices.
B. Evolution of Price Sensitivity
Note that the price sensitivity η f i may exhibit periodic patterns like other time series in economics and business, or in general vary over time. For example, consumers may be less sensitive to price changes during Christmas holidays or other special events. Therefore, understanding its dynamics is a critical step in making pricing policy for future planning periods. Since price sensitivities cannot be directly observed, they are collectively called state variables in the state-space representation, and their evolution will be described by the state equation in our statespace model.
Many popular parametric time series structures can be used to describe the dependence of η f i on its previous values, such as autoregressive moving-average models, unit-root nonstationary random walk, Markov switching models, and threshold autoregressive models. However, in practice, we may not have sufficient knowledge to prespecify a parametric form, and demand learning cannot be perfectly achieved by arbitrarily assuming a parametric structure. Moreover, the prediction performance is poor when the data are not actually driven by the model we specified.
Fortunately, recent developments of nonparametric techniques and computing facilities provide an alternative to model time series and relax parametric constraints, where no prior assumption of the model structure is required. Here, we will use the FAR model proposed by Chen and Tsay [18] , which proved robust against a range of underlying time series structures and is good at out-of-sample forecasting. Thus, the fluctuation of underlying state variables is captured by the state equation
where
is a vector of lagged values of η t and f j , j = 1, . . . , m 1 , are measurable functions from m 2 to 1 assumed to be continuous and twice differentiable almost surely with respect to their arguments. The estimation of coefficient functions f 1 , . . . , f m 1 from observed demands and prices allows appreciable flexibility on the structure of the state equation. In fact, many popular linear or nonlinear parametric models are special cases of the FAR model. Recently, the FAR model has been widely studied. To mention a few, Hoover et al. [19] developed the functional-coefficient model to longitudinal data. Cai et al. [20] applied the local linear regression method to estimate coefficient functions, which showed substantial improvements in postsample forecasts over other parametric models. Tsay [21] further suggested fitting FAR models to discover nonlinear evolution of the state transition equation when specifying a nonlinear state-space model.
C. Optimal Control Problem for a Noncompetitive Market
In this section, we provide an optimal control problem in a noncompetitive market, which is used to compare the performance of various demand learning strategies in Section V-A. The objective function of a firm is to maximize the net present value of revenue by providing a service with limited capacity over finite time horizon from t 0 to t f . The firm's revenue at each time period can be calculated by multiplying the specified price and the realized demand. Nominal discount rate or interest rate r is used to compute the net present value of revenue.
The customer demand and the price sensitivity evolve over time according to the dynamics introduced in the previous sections. The price charged by this firm has upper and lower bounds due to market regulation, customer behaviors, and firm's nonnegligible cost. Moreover, the demand may be restricted by the nonnegativity constraint and the limited capacity of the service provider. Consequently, a firm faces the following optimization problem:
where π max and π min are positive upper and lower bounds of price, respectively. D max is the upper bound of demand.
D. Formulation for Competition
When competition among multiple firms offering multiple services is considered, the equilibrium problem can be formulated as a DVI [22] . The solution of DVI represents CournotNash equilibria for the revenue-maximizing game of each firm. In this section, we present a DVI formulation for competition of multiple service providers. Since each firm f in a market maximizes revenue, it has the following optimal control problem:
In the objective function (5) of this model, prices are determined to maximize net profit value of revenue. Equations (6) and (7) represent the demand dynamics with equally weighted average p f τ (t) for all f at t. In other words, p f τ (t) is equal to 1/|F |(t − t 0 ) and the reference price becomesπ i (t) =
, where |F | is the number of companies. By introducing a dummy variable y i (t),π i (t) can be written as y i (t)/|F |(t − t 0 ) together with (7) . Initial values are considered in (8) and (9) and K f i,0 is the initial demand of service i by the firm f . Equation (10) ensures that the price is bounded by its lower and upper limits. A joint resource constraint for firm f is represented by (11) , where A is an incidence matrix showing the relationship between services and resources and C f r is the capacity of the resource r of the firm f . The incidence matrix A = (a ir ) is defined as a ir = 1, if resource is used by service type i 0, othewise.
The last constraint (12) reflects the nonnegativity condition. For the optimal control problem with fixed terminal time, Hamiltonian H f is defined as
The two new variables, λ (11) and (12) . Now, we have the following DVI formulation and the solution represents Cournot-Nash equilibria for the revenue-maximizing game of each firm:
III. ESTIMATION AND PREDICTION
So far, we have introduced a revenue management model for demand learning, where demand dynamics is described by a state-space model, and the optimal pricing policy can be obtained by solving the corresponding optimization problem. By making use of the historical data, we could estimate unknown quantities in the state-space model, and then forecast realized demands in the future following our optimization procedure.
However, since observations for model estimation occur only at discrete times, we first discretize a whole planning period into K subintervals with the same length and suppose one observation is made at the end of each subinterval. Then, the state-space model is reformulated as . . , η K using observed demands and prices in the past planning periods, forecast the dynamics of η t in the next planning period, and finally determine the firm's pricing policy for the next planning period to maximize the revenue.
A. MCMC Estimation for State-Space Model With AR(1) State Dynamics
Let us start from a parametric state equation by assuming an autoregressive state dynamics. That is, we assume that the dynamic of price sensitivity η k follows an AR(1) process. Then, we have m 1 = 1, m 2 = 1, and f 1 = φ. That is, the state equation is reduced to
In our MCMC-implemented Bayesian estimation, we choose the following conjugate prior distributions for parameters in the state-space model:
, where IG refers to inverse gamma distribution and N refers to a normal distribution. Then, at the ith iteration, the MCMC steps are as follows. and the prior distribution is conjugate inverse gamma, the conditional distribution of σ 2 is also inverse gamma. Therefore, conditioning on ω 2(i−1) , φ (i−1) , and
from the previous iteration, we draw a new sample σ 2(i) from the following distribution:
3) Update ω 2 , variance of errors in the observation equation. Similarly, ω 2(i) is drawn from its posterior distribution 
, which on manipulation gives the following posterior distribution:
and
Since this posterior distribution is not a closed form, we cannot directly draw a new sample η (i) t . So, we use the accept-reject algorithm or in general the MetropolisHasting algorithm. 5) Update the AR(1) coefficient φ. The state equation gives η t ∼ N (φη t−1 , σ 2 ); therefore, by conjugate normal prior we specified in the initialization step, the posterior distribution of φ is also normal:
. We sample φ (i) from this distribution. 6) Repeat 2-5. Up to now, we have carried out one cycle of the MCMC and are ready to continue sampling for the next cycle. The sample process continues until the chains converge to the stationary distributions. We then collect all posterior samples and use their posterior medians as the point estimates of all parameters and latent state variables.
B. MCMC Estimation for State-Space Model With Functional Coefficients
However, if we do not assume any parametric structure forf j (·)s, nonparametric techniques such as kernel regression or local linear regression can be used to estimate the functional coefficientsf j (·)'s. In our example, we take m 1 = 2 and m 2 = 1 to avoid overfitting as suggested by Cai et al. [20] . In this way, price sensitivity at time t, η t , is regressed on η t−1 and η t−2 , and the functional regression coefficients only depend on η t−1 . The extension to cases m 1 > 2 and m 2 > 1 is straightforward. Therefore, the state equation in our state-space model becomes
In the presence of functional coefficient, the MCMC estimating procedure is similar to the one we described earlier. However, the conditional posterior distribution of state variables η t becomes L η
Since there is no corresponding closed form for this posterior distribution, we again employ the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm to get posterior samples of η (i) t that follow this distribution. According to the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm, at each cycle of the MCMC, we first draw a sample from a closed-form distribution, which is called proposal distribution, and then accept this sample with certain probability. After many iterations, the resulting posterior samples follow the desired distribution. In particular, at the ith iteration, we draw a new sample of η t denoted by η * t from a proposal distribution
and then accept η (i) t = η * t with the probability min(1, p * ), where
.
(22) If the new value η *
t is not accepted, we set η
Moreover, we are not updating ϕ here but updating more general two functions f 1 and f 2 by least-squares estimations based on η
t of the current iteration. That is, we havê
In the aforementioned expression, 
Likewise, after the chains become stationary, we calculate the medians of all posterior samples as point estimates. By plugging in estimated parameters, estimated coefficient functions and estimated latent state variables of the past, future state variables can be predicted.
C. MCMC Estimation for Missing Data
In the aforementioned two algorithms, we assume that there are no missing data. That is, we observe ΔD t and π t for t = 1, 2, . . . , K. However, in practice, a subset of observations, say ΔD t and π t , may be missing. If statistical inference is easier when we have the complete data consisting of observed data and missing data, we may use a strategy called "data augment" to overcome the difficulties due to missing data. The essential idea here is to substitute the missing values with simulations, and then perform the standard estimation procedure using the augmented dataset. The strategy allows us to estimate all missing values, and facilitates the parameter estimations, since the proposed estimation procedure based on the complete data remains after data augment.
Assume that ΔD t , t = v 1 , . . . , v n and π t , t = w 1 , . . . , w n are missing which means that we have n + n missing values. Before implementing MCMC algorithms, we may initialize missing observations. Then, at the ith iteration of the MCMC sampling procedure described earlier, we draw a new sample ΔD (i) t from its posterior distribution conditional on η
and draw π 
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
A. Single Firm's Problem
Let us first consider a monopoly market where a single firm provides a service. We assume that the true price sensitivity follows one of the following patterns: 1) random walk: η t = η t−1 + u t [12] ; 2) autoregressive structure of order 1: η t = 0.8η t−1 + u t ; 3) autoregressive structure of order 2: η t = 0.8η t−1 + 0.4η t−2 + u t ; 4) sine wave: η t = sin(t) + 2 + u t [22] ; 5) composite sine wave: η t = sin(t) + sin(2t) + sin(4t) + u t ; and 6) sawtooth wave:
2 ), and σ 2 = 0.2. Although these state dynamics of price sensitivities are unknown to the service provider, given historical demands and prices (see Fig. 1 ), a firm can estimate their patterns and make forecasts using one of the following demand learning strategies: 1) the Kalman filter for linear state dynamics proposed by Kwon et al. [12] ; 2) the MCMC algorithm with assumed AR(1) dynamics; and 3) the MCMC algorithm with the FAR model.
We assess the forecasting performance of different strategies by the average squared errors (ASE) whereη t is the predicted price sensitivity in the next planning period (30 days). Table I gives ASE of each learning method. Since Kalman filter demand learning assumes a random walk dynamics of price sensitivity, it yields good forecasts only when the true price sensitivity indeed follows a random walk process. Similarly, MCMC demand learning with assumed AR(1) dynamics has good performance only when the underlying state dynamics follows a random walk or AR(1) process, since the AR(1) structure reduces to a random walk when the autoregressive parameter is close to 1. Therefore, it is clear that for parametric demand learning methods, to achieve good predictive performance, the assumed parametric structure of unobservable state dynamics should be correct. On the other hand, the nonparametric MCMC demand learning provides the most accurate forecasts for all underlying price sensitivity dynamics, since the nonparametric technique could recover it nicely from the historical data without assuming state dynamics.
After predicting price sensitivity dynamics by one of the three strategies, optimal pricing policy for the future planning period is determined by simulated annealing algorithms. Then, according to true underlying dynamics of η t , demands corresponding to the pricing policies are observed respectively and realized revenues are calculated. We take the sine underlying dynamics as an example, and report the realized revenues in Table II As we can see from Table II , the Kalman filter method could not generate more revenue than the other learning methods, since its restrictive assumption of linear dynamics of state variables as discussed earlier, but nonparametric MCMC demand learning strategy significantly outperforms the others. As noise decreases, the average revenues of all demand learning methods increase, which implies that the overall accuracy of demand learning methods improves; as noise increases, the observed data include a significant proportion of randomness, and thus it is very hard to recover the underlying dynamics from the data by any statistical demand learning method. Finally, when the noise is large enough (includingσ ≥ 1), revenues generated by three methods are similar since it is very difficult to extract pattern form the data. This simulation study in a noncompetitive market demonstrates the motivation and importance of demand learning for dynamic pricing.
B. Multiple Firms' Problem-Competition
In cases of competition, one firm's demand and revenue are influenced by competing firms' pricing policy. Therefore, demand parameters for all firms in a market have to be estimated and forecasted simultaneously when demand learning-based dynamic pricing is performed. In this section, it is assumed that the firms believe that competitors are also using the same learning strategy (e.g., [4] ). Also, we assume that the market has reached equilibrium during the past planning period. With the historical market data, each firm can select one of the following pricing policies: 1) random pricing; 2) static pricing, and 3) demand learning-based dynamic pricing. A firm employing random pricing policy chooses time-varying random price within a feasible price set. For static pricing, the average value in a feasible price set is calculated and the single estimate is used during the next planning horizon. In the case of dynamic pricing, the MCMC algorithm with the FAR model is considered as a demand learning strategy.
Our numerical example considers two firms with four services and five resources to illustrate the revenue maximization problem under competition. Table III summarizes the service-TABLE III  SERVICE-DEPENDENT DATA   TABLE IV RESOURCE-DEPENDENT DATA dependent data including initial demands and price boundaries according to Friesz et al. [22] . Also, Table IV shows the resource capacity for each firm. The incidence matrix between resources and services is given by Table V shows the average revenues of 100 simulations for different combinations of pricing policies. We observe that when competitor's pricing strategy is fixed, demand learning-based dynamic pricing is a better approach for a firm in a noncooperative competitive market. Specifically, when firm 2 is using random or static pricing, firm 1 can increase its revenue by adopting dynamic pricing with demand learning strategy. For example, the average revenue of firm 1 is 1697 640 when both companies are using static pricing strategy and the noise is 0.2. After changing pricing strategy to dynamic pricing, its average revenue jumps to 6191 086.
Even if firm 2 is using dynamic pricing, firm 1 should also use dynamic pricing with learning to increase revenue. Let us look at the case when firm 2 is employing dynamic pricing and the noise is 0.2. The average revenue of firm 1 is 211 979 with random pricing or 183 847 with static pricing. However, firm 1 can increase its revenue to 1 009 328 by employing demand learning-based dynamic pricing. This result holds the other way around. That is, when firm 1's policy is fixed, firm 2 should use dynamic pricing with demand learning regardless of the competitor's pricing strategy. However, one interesting observation is that the realized revenues decrease significantly if both firms are adopting the learning method compared to the case where both firms are using random pricing or static pricing. It can be interpreted that noncooperative firms will be worse off as long as there is competition and demand learning.
C. Managerial Implications
Our numerical experiments have several managerial implications. First, they indicate that dynamic pricing together with demand learning is the best strategy to take no matter whether a firm is in a monopoly market or in a noncooperative competitive market. It is well known that dynamic pricing is an effective way to manipulate market demand and maximize revenue in short run. However, without an appropriate demand learning strategy, a firm may not be able to forecast customers' response to price changes, which leads to inappropriate dynamic pricing decision and loss of sales opportunity.
Second, the numerical example of a monopoly market demonstrates that a good statistical learning method is crucial to the success of demand learning. Although assumptions of model structure could provide analytical tractability and reduce computational cost, incorrect assumptions about the unobserved dynamics will essentially deteriorate the power of demand learning and result in biased estimation of future demands. On the other hand, the nonparametric FAR model with MCMC algorithms is the state-of-the-art method for discovering underlying patterns from the data. Despite its sophisticated representation and algorithms, it makes most of the data available, and automatically formulates an equation that best describes the evolution of underlying dynamics of price sensitivity. What is more, the increasing computational power nowadays allows easy and fast implementations of this method.
Third, in a competitive market, a firm's revenue is determined according to its own pricing decision as well as competitors' decisions. Similar to the monopoly case, our analysis indicates that a firm can take advantage of demand learning in a competitive market. In practice, it may be difficult to know the demand learning and pricing strategies of competitors, but our results show that it makes sense to employ the proposed demand learning and dynamic pricing strategy even when competitor's information is incomplete.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper proposed a demand learning strategy from the perspective of evolutionary game theory, and showed how this strategy can be used for the dynamic pricing problem in both monopoly and oligopoly markets. MCMC algorithms were developed to estimate unknown parameters and state variables (price sensitivities) in our demand learning model. Nonparametric techniques based on FAR models were incorporated to discover the dynamics of unobserved price sensitivities such that no arbitrary model assumption is needed. After estimating how demand response to price changes, a simulated annealing algorithm and a fixed-point algorithm were employed to obtain the optimal pricing policy in a monopoly market and a duopoly market, respectively. The simulation results showed that our new method provides better estimations and predictions of price sensitivity, and is robust over a wide range of underlying state dynamics.
Industrial and market data tend to be messy: the underlying state dynamics could be very complicated and many missing values may exist. Compared with existing demand learning and dynamics pricing methods, our procedure can be directly applied to the data without requiring careful model specification and a great deal of time-consuming data preprocessing. For example, Bertsimas and Perakis [4] assumed a linear function to model demand and price, and Kwon et al. [12] assumed a random walk for describing an uncertain parameter. However, our nonparametric demand learning strategy does not make assumptions about model structures, and could adaptively and precisely recover the unobserved price sensitivities. As a result, this learning strategy avoids the risk of model misspecification and is immune to missing values, which are crucial to the following dynamics pricing step. Finally, we provided optimization algorithms that successfully resolve the computational difficulties introduced by the nonparametric demand learning step.
For numerical and theoretical simplicity, our study was focused on homogeneous customers who have the same reference price in mind. The scope of future work could be extended to dynamic pricing problems with heterogeneous customers. Future research could also extend this method to different market scenarios. For example, the efficiency of collaboration between competitors for demand learning can be explored. Moreover, robust optimization approach can be applied to dynamic pricing problems when reliable historical data are unavailable and decision maker can only estimate the boundaries of uncertain parameters.
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